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CASE COMMENT
AGENT ORANGE AND BOYLE: LEADING THE
WAY IN MASS TOXIC TORT ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Servicemen who were exposed to Agent Orange during the Vietnam War
and their children have suffered, and continue to suffer from an array of
illnesses.1 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation2 represented an
attempt to lay blame for the continuing effects of the war, in which the man-
ufacturers of Agent Orange became a likely target for this cupability. The
manufacturers relied on the government contractor defense - an exception
in product liability law which allows a contractor to as an extension of the
government gain protection under sovereign immunity.3 A $180 million set-
tlement was accepted by Eastern District of New York Judge Weinstein
before he ruled on the defense. However, Judge Weinstein did develop a
unique test for the government contractor defense while presiding over this
unprecedented mass toxic tort litigation. Applying this test, other courts
have granted summary judgment in favor of the contractors in other Agent
Orange cases.4
During the 1988 term, the Supreme Court upheld the use of the govern-
ment contractor defense and created a uniform test. In Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.,' the Court reaffirmed the proper use of the government
1. Meyers, Soldier of Orange: The Administrative, Diplomatic, Legislative and Litigatory
Impact of Herbicide Agent Orange in South Vietnam, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 159, 180-83
(1979). Agent Orange is now linked to cancer, fetal growth deficiencies and spontaneous abor-
tion, mutation and numerous systemic disorders.
2. 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984). The district
court specifically defined for the first time the elements of the government contractor defense.
Id. at 1055.
3. The-defense has its genesis in the Feres doctrine which prevented members of the
United States military from recovering for injuries which "arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service." Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). See also Stencel
Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (barring recovery would prevent
"second-guessing" of military orders by the judicial system).
4. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
5. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988). The Supreme Court for the first time recognized the govern-
ment contractor defense and outlined the required standard.
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contractor defense while broadening Judge Weinstein's original test. Many
authors believe the test will "lead to fundamental changes in the relationship
of the federal government to its contractors, as well .as in the way in which
aggressive plaintiffs' attorneys pursue their clients' personal injury claims
against government contractors." '6 The Boyle fact pattern, while unrelated
to toxic tort litigation, will nevertheless have an impact on all subsequent
uses of the defense in toxic tort cases.
This Note will review the rationales for the government contractor de-
fense, emphasizing the discretionary function rule and the concern for equi-
table treatment. Next, this Note will explore the influence of the Agent
Orange litigation on the modern government contractor defense. The Boyle
decision will then be analyzed by examining the reason for the test as well as
its limitations. The Note will conclude with a discussion of the possible con-
sequences of these two interpretations of the government contractor defense
and the effect of yet unanswered questions on future mass toxic tort actions.
II. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE EXPLAINED
The government contractor defense enables the contractor to claim a
"complete defense" to actions in negligence, warranty, or product liability
resulting from products supplied to or designed for the government.7 Thus,
the defense was created as a reaction to public policy concerns surrounding
the possible ramifications of product liability in weapons manufacturing.
The policies are directed at both protecting the decision-making powers of
the-armed services and guaranteeing fair treatment for the contractor.
A. Protecting the Discretionary Function
Courts have been reluctant to subject military contractors to full tort lia-
bility because it would "inject the judicial branch into political and military
decisions that are beyond its constitutional authority and institutional com-
petence." 8 This public policy, commonly referred to as the discretionary
function, has been broadly defined by the Court as an action requiring a
6. Willmore, Boyle in Court: Invitation for New Litigation Strategies, Legal Times, July
18, 1988, at 16, col. 3. See also Kriendler, The Government Contractor Defense, 200 N.Y.L.J.
3.
7. Comment, Agent Orange and the Government Contract Defense: Are Military Manu-
facturers Immune from Products Liability?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 494 (1982).
8. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 191. Many circuits have addressed
the government contractor defense. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (1 1th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.
1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1043 (1984).
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"policy judgment and decision." 9 Therefore, it has been held that for a deci-
sion to-be truly "discretionary," the government must have the freedom to
judge or choose from a variety of options without judicial interference.' °
However, courts do play a role in interpreting governmental decisions as
discretionary or operational. A decision, such as not ordering a mechanical
locking device on a dump truck," can be judicially reviewed because of the
existence of fixed standards for measuring the merits of these decisions.
Moreover, review of these matters Would not usurp the government's discre-
tion.' 2 In contrast, decisions relating to wartime military contracts are gen-
erally classified as discretionary and thus receive special consideration.
These decisions are less likely to be reviewed. "[W]hether the weapon in-
volves any risk at all [is a] proper concern[ ] of the military which selects,
buys and uses the weapon. But [it is] not [a] source[] of liability which
should be thrust upon a supplier, nor [is it a] decision[ ] ... properly made
by a court.' 3 Courts have warned that "[t]o impose liability on a govern-
mental contractor ... would seriously impair governments [sic] ability to
formulate policy and make judgments pursuant to its war powers."' 4 Conse-
quently, the courts' respect of the discretionary function policy has become a
focal point in the development of the modern government contract defense.
B. Equitable Treatment for Contractors.
A significant rationale for the creation of the government contractor de-
fense was to ensure fair treatment and to relieve the burden of full liability
on the contractor. In opposition to basic tenets of tort law, this defense
specifically holds that a contractor who ably performs a manufacturing con-
tract according to detailed, yet defective design specifications, will not as-
sume any resulting liability.' 5 The defense directs that the wrongdoer who
authored those specifications bears responsibility.' 6 The reasons for the de-
fense become apparent when analyzing the effect of possible liability on the
procurement process' 7 and national security.' 8 The threat of liability in the
9. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953).
10. Agent Orange and the Government Contract Defense, supra note 7, at 521.
11. See Medley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (M.D. Ala. 1979).
12. Agent Orange and the Government Contract Defense, supra.note 7, at 521.
13. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 (2d Cir. 1982).
14. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 9, 364 A.2d 43, 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1976), 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), cert. denied,
75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 816 (1978).
15. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
16. Id.
17. The procurement process is the regulated mechanism in which government contracts
are awarded. It is believed that if contractors are exposed to full tort liability, the procurement
1990]
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procurement process could manifest itself in escalating contractors' costs
due to insurance difficulties or the impossibility to procure any insurance at
all. The likely ensuing liquidations or reorganizations" among military con-
tractors, could affect national security.2°
The defense, viewed as a mechanism to maintain a healthy military indus-
trial complex, could without its protection cause:
a manufacturer capable of producing military goods for govern-
ment use [to] face the untenable position of choosing between se-
vere penalties for failing to supply products necessary to conduct a
war,2 1 and producing what the government requires but at a con-
tract price that makes no provision for the need to insure against
potential liability for design flaws in the government's plans.
22
This "catch-22" situation disrupts the procurement process by giving the
contractor few incentives "to work closely with and to consult the military
authorities in the development and testing of equipment ' 23 essential to en-
courage "uninhibited assistance of private contractors" 24 in the advance-
ment of military technology. Likewise, national security may be threatened
by this scenario. Courts reason that if military contractors are faced with
potentially massive liability awards they will avoid entering the industry and
the United States will fall behind in the weapons buildup.
Therefore, the policy rationales which dictate the direction of the govern-
ment contractor defense encompass many of the fundamental concerns of
the United States Department of Defense and the American people. These
policy rationales while characterized as a fairness justification rather, reflect
a belief protecting the military industry.
process would be severely impaired. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 191
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
18. Id.
19. See Stouk, Government Contracts and Tort Liability: Time for Reform, 30 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 70, 75 (1983). Liability for a catastrophic event could easily "exceed both the
available insurance and the net worth of those contractors." Id. at 70.
20. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 1987).
21. Judge Pratt is referring to the Defense Production Act which compels contractors to
perform the contracts or face "upon conviction, [a fine] not more than $10,000, or im-
prison[ment] not more than one year, or both." 50 U.S.C. App. § 2073 (1982). The contrac-
tors involved in Agent Orange production were subject to the Act.
22. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
23. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984).
24. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897
(1988).
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II. IN RE AGENT ORANGE: THE CREATION OF A MODERN DEFENSE
A. The Pratt Test
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. represented the collectivized claims
of Vietnam veterans, their spouses, their parents, and their children25 in a
class action against the manufacturers26 of Agent Orange. After a series of
jurisdictional conflicts, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered
all Agent Orange cases consolidated and transferred to the District Court for
the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs relied on numerous theo-
ries one of which was product liability. The manufacturers asserted the gov-
ernment contractor defense. After seven years of litigation, the settlement
awarding $180 million to the plaintiffs was upheld.27
However, years before settlement, Judge Pratt, the first presiding judge,
developed what was viewed as the modern form of the government contrac-
tor defense.28 To successfully utilize the defense, the contractor must prove
each element of a three-pronged test:
1. That the government established the specifications for [the prod-
uct]; 2. That the [product] manufactured by the defendant met the
government's specifications in all material respects; and 3. That the
government knew as much as or more than the defendant about
the hazards to people that accompanied use of [the product].29
The first two prongs have "fairly light" 30 burdens of proof. Judge Pratt con-
cluded that, under the first prong, it was only necessary that "the product
... supplied [by the contractor] was [the] particular product specified by the
government."3 The contractor's involvement in preparing the specifications
25. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 769.
26. Initially, there were nineteen defendant companies which were reduced to seven by
the conclusion of the case. Id. at 768.
27. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
28. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
Although, in Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (1977), the court
applied similar reasoning. It was not until Agent Orange that a test was created especially for
military contractors. See Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (A negli-
gence suit sought against public works contractors).
29. Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
30. Note, The Government Contractor Defense: Is Sovereign Immunity a Necessary Perqui-
site?, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 495, 507 (1986). The author notes that "[p]rongs one and two
are particularly unimportant if government approval of contractor designs is sufficient to give
rise to the defense." Id. at 507 n.46. See also Scadron, The New Government Contractor De
fense: Will It Insulate Asbestos Manufacturers From Liability For The Harm Caused By Their
Insulation Products?, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 375, 377 n.8 (1988-89) ("[t]he government action
necessary to trigger the defense [is] minimal . . .").
31. Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1056. The approval requirement has been stretched by
the circuits so that the defense applies even when the contractor drew up all the specifications
in detail because the specifications were approved by the military. In McKay v. Rockwell Int'l
1990]
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became "relevant [only in] ... establish[ing] the relative degrees of knowl-
edge as between the government and the defendants."32 Under the second
prong, the defense would only be defeated if the "discrepancy between speci-
fications and product was a material one.",33 According to Judge, Pratt, the
"central question" of the test was addressed in the third prong.34
Judge Pratt, before assigning the case over to Judge Weinstein, 35 granted
summary judgment in the defendants' favor on the first two prongs of the
test. "Each defendant has established ... that the government established
specifications for Agent Orange and that the Agent Orange manufactured by
the defendant met those specifications in all material respects.",3 6 Judge
Pratt concluded that the three remaining contractors37 had not sufficiently
proven the "question of relative knowledge" known to the contractor and
questions of fact remained as to when the knowledge of possible hazards was
determined.38
B. Judge Weinstein Alters the test
When applying Judge Pratt's test to the facts in Agent Orange, Judge
Weinstein faced many difficult issues posed by plaintiffs' counsel. The plain-
tiffs contended that the defendants' role in developing Agent Orange and
their long time civilian experience with its components made it the defend-
ants' own product and therefore, the government contract defense was inap-
plicable.39 In an amicus brief, the Justice Department contended that
dioxin, the injury-causing ingredient of Agent Orange, was never ordered by
the government to be included as an ingredient.' This contention was dam-
Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984), the plaintiffs have no
cause of action tinder the first prong of Judge Pratt's test since "the United States ... ap-
proved, reasonably precise specifications for the allegedly defective military equipment." 704
F.2d at 451. "
32. Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1057.
33. Id.
34. Id. Judge Pratt in his discussion of the third prong, concluded that "if a defendant
was aware of hazards that might reasonably have affected the government's decision about the
use of 'Agent Orange,' and if that defendant failed to disclose those hazards to the government,
then the defense fails." Id. at 1057-58. See also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F.
Supp. at 1265 ("the central issue raised ... centers on its third element.").
35. Judge Weinstein presided over the Agent Orange litigation after Judge Pratt was pro-
moted to the-Second Circuit.
36. Agent Orange, 565"F. Supp.-at 1274.
37. Dow Chemical Company, T.H. Agriculture & Nutrition Company and Uniroyal, Inc.
were denied summary judgment of all the issues. Id. at 1270-72.
38. Id.
39. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
40. United States Memorandum in Opposition to defendants' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment based on the Government Contractor Defense at 8, Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 848.
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aging to the defendants, because, if proved, it would negate their reliance on
the discretionary theory.
The defendants' response to these allegations influenced Judge Weinstein's
decision to allow for the application of the defense, though insisting upon
modifications.41 The defendants maintained that although the components
of Agent Orange were not unique, the spray concentrations were much
greater than those recommended for civilian use and, in addition, the spray
was used without the recommended precautions. This change, the defend-
ants claimed, made the product distinctively different from the civilian prod-
uct and thus, a military product.42 Moreover, the defendants asserted that
they were compelled to produce Agent Orange during wartime and subse-
quently had little control over the use of the herbicide.43
With these arguments and the general policy reasons for the government
contractor defense in consideration, Judge Weinstein crafted a new standard
of liability which expanded the third prong of Judge Pratt's test. While the
first two prongs remained intact, under the expanded third prong the plain-
tiff had to prove, "with other elements of the cause of action, that the
hazards to him that accompanied use of Agent Orange were or reasonably
should have been known to the defendant."' Judge Weinstein was satisfied
that a proper balance was struck by the now expanded third prong. Under
this standard, the defendants had the burden of proving:
that the government knew as much or more than that defendant.
knew or reasonably should have known about the dangers of Agent
Orange, or even if the government had had as much knowledge as
that of the defendant should have had, it would have ordered pro-
duction of Agent Orange in any event and would not have taken
steps to reduce or eliminate the hazard.45
Judge Weinstein specifically used the "knew or reasonably should have
known" standard with the contractor to insure that, in the case of a highly
technical product, a manufacturer is not encouraged to know as little as pos-
sible about the dangers of its product.46 In not imposing the "should have
known" standard on the government, Judge Weinstein carefully avoided any
possible interference in the military's discretionary function.47 Judge Wein-
stein never ruled on whether the companies satisfied the test because he
granted settlement between the parties.






47. Id. at 850.
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In combination with these allegations, Judge Weinstein stated in his settle-
ment opinion that, if the dangers alleged by the plaintiffs that accompanied
the spraying of Agent Orange were correct, then those dangers were "far
greater than those posed by the products in the 'ordinary' product liability
cases in which the government contract defense has been invoked, and un-
precedented in tort law in their magnitude."4
In further litigation by those veterans who had chosen not to join in the
Agent Orange class action, the question of whether the contractor satisfied
the test was addressed.49 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit up-
held the district court ruling granting summary judgment in favor of the
contractors because the court found no genuine factual dispute as to whether
the government possessed as much information as the chemical companies
with respect to the possible hazards of Agent Orange.5" The court of ap-
peals concluded that the proper use of Agent Orange required a balancing of
the risk to friendly personnel against the potential military advantage that
the use of the defoliant would provide.5 The contractors only responsibility
was to advise the government of hazards known to them in order for the
government to make an informed balancing of the risks and hereafter.
52
The court devised a test to evaluate whether a possible hazard warranted
an obligation of the contractor to warn the government. First, the hazard
must be based on scientific evidence. "A military contractor is no more
obiligated to inform the government of speculative risks than it is entitled to
claim speculative benefits." 5 3 Second, the nature of the danger to friendly
personnel must be serious enough to justify a weighing of the risks against
the military benefits.54 Neither aspect of this test was satisfied in the Agent
Orange case because the court concluded that there was a "paucity" of sci-
entific evidence indicating that the herbicide was hazardous.55 Furthermore,
the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that Agent
Orange in fact caused their injuries." In forming its decision, the court con-
48. Id. at 849.
49. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 2898 (1988). This opinion addressed the disposition of 287 appeals taken from Judge
Weinstein's decision granting summary judgement to the defendants. See In re Agent Orange
Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
50. Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 189-90.
51. Id. at 192.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 193.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 190. The court did note that epidemiological studies do not exclude the possi-
bility of harm in isolated cases but that this fact is irrelevant because it does not "constitute
evidence material to the military decisions in question." Id. at 194.
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strued Congress' decision not to compensate veterans claiming exposure to
Agent Orange57 as a reflection of Congress' factual conclusion that Agent
Orange was only hazardous in a limited manner. 58 In the court's view, Con-
gress' actions "further demonstrate[d] that the military decision to use
Agent Orange was [considered] fully informed."5 9 In complete agreement
with the policies supporting the government contractor defense, Judge Win-
ter concluded that holding contractors "liable in such circumstances would
be unjust to them and would create a devastating precedent"0 by exposing
the contractor as the sole "deep pocket." 61
III. BOYLE V UNITED TECHNOLOGIES, CORP.: CREATES
A NEW WAY To PLAY
A. The Test Defined
In 1983, a United Technologies helicopter crashed into the Atlantic
Ocean, resulting in the death of Marine pilot David Boyle. Boyle's estate
sued the contractor, citing negligence and breach of warranty in the design
of the helicopter escape hatch. A district court jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for $725,000.62 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the
court of appeals reversed as a matter of federal law, finding that the defend-
ants could not be held liable for the defective designs because the contractor
satisfied the requirements of the military contractor defense as recognized by
the court.63 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
contractor was immune from tort liability because the design of and access
to the escape hatch conformed with government specifications and whether
the defense should be governed by federal or state law.64
57. Veteran's Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No.
98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (The Act allowed for compensation for chloracne and PCT but
rejected earlier versions that would have compensated such veterans for other medical condi-
tions including soft tissue sarcomas and birth defects).
58. Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 194.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 191.
62. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S.
Ct. 2570 (1988).
63. Id. The Fourth Circuit relied on a four-prong test: the contractor must prove that "1)
the United States is immune from liability; 2) the United States approved reasonably precise
specifications for the equipment; 3) the equipment conformed to these specifications; and 4) the
supplier warned the United States about dangers in the use of the equipment that were known
to the supplier but not to the United States." Id. The court cited as the source of this test the
prior Fourth Circuit decision of Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
64. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2513 (1988).
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,65 stated that the Court has been
reluctant to find federal preemption of state law without a clear statutory
mandate.or a direct conflict between federal and state law. There are, how-
ever, a few areas involving federal interests "so committed by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States to federal control that the state law is
preempted.", 66 The Court held, that the dispute in this case bordered on
"two areas that [the Court has] found to involve such 'uniquely federal inter-
ests.' ,67 First, obligations to and rights of the United States under its con-
tracts are governed exclusively by federal law.6' The performance of a
government contract represents an obligation of the United States. 69 Sec-
ond, the civil liabilities of federal officials for actions taken in the course of
their duty have traditionally been controlled by federal law.7" The Court
compared the position of an independent contractor performing its obliga-
tions under a procurement contract with that of an official performing his
duty as a federal employee and determined that both have a similar interest
in "getting the [g]overnment's work done."71 The Court concluded that the
"reasons for considering those closely related areas to be of 'uniquely fed-
eral' interest apply as well to the civil liabilities arising out of the perform-
ance of federal procurement contracts."72 Those reasons were embodied in
the discretionary function involved. Therefore, the Court displaced state
law and applied federal law. The Court limited displacement to "only where
* . . [a] 'significant conflict' exists between an identifiable 'federal policy or
interest 'and the [operation] of state law' 73 or the application of state law
would 'frustrate specific objectives' of federal legislation.",
74
Reiterating the policy reasons supporting the government contractor de-
fense, the Court justified the defense based upon the "discretionary func-
tion" inherent in military procurements. 75 "[W]e are . . . of the view that
65. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined Justice
Scalia's opinion. Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's dissent. Justice
Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion.
66. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-94 (1973)).
69. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514.
70. Id.
71. Id. (footnote omitted).
72. Id. The Court cites for support Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18
(1940) (a public works contractor was held not liable under state law because the project was
done within the powers delegated by Congress).
73. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)).
74. Id. (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)).
75. Id. at 2517.
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permitting 'second-guessing' of these judgements,... through state tort suits
against contractors would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by
the FTCA exemption."76 The Court specified that design selection "is assur-
edly a discretionary function within the meaning of ... [the FTCA] provi-
sion."77 Moreover, the Court noted that the practical effect of denying the
defense could result in financial burdens on the contractor which would ulti-
mately be passed through to the Government itself in the form of higher
procurement prices."
After analyzing the conflicting standards of the government contractor
defense adopted in several federal circuits, the Court formulated a three-
prong test under which a contractor may escape liability for defects in mili-
tary equipment so long as: "(1) [T]he United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications;
and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of
the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United
States." 79
The first two prongs of the Boyle test assure that the suit falls within the
scope of the discretionary function doctrine. The third prong is necessary
"because, in its absence, the displacement of state tort law would create
some incentive for the manufacturer to withhold knowledge of risks, since
conveying the knowledge might disrupt the contract but withholding it
would produce no liability."' The underlying purpose of the standard sup-
ports the promotion of "active contractor participation in the design process,
[without] placing the contractor at risk unless it [fails to] identify all design
defects."'
The Court specifically rejected the standard that the Eleventh Circuit
adopted in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp. 82 Under the Shaw test, the
contractor would escape liability if it did not participate, or only participated
minimally in the design of defective equipment. Alternatively, the contrac-
76. Id. at 2517-18 (citation omitted). FCTA is a consent to sue for harm caused by negli-
gent or wrongful conduct of government employees, to the extent a private person could be
sued. The exemption disallow suits which are based on the "exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function ... on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
77. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517. The Court's justification for devising the test clearly sup-
ported the policy reasons which created the defense. See supra notes 7-23 and accompanying
text.
78. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
79. Id. This language is identical to the Fourth Circuit standard. See supra note 63.
80. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
81. Id.
82. 778 F.2d 735, 746 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896, reh'g denied, 109 S.
Ct. 10 (1988).
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tor could avoid liability if it timely warned the government of the design
risks and informed it of reasonably known alternative designs and the gov-
ernment clearly authorized subsequent production.8 3 The Court concluded
that this formulation did not sufficiently protect the discretionary function
exception.8 4 The Court queried that "the design ultimately selected may
well reflect a significant policy judgment by Government officials whether or
not the contractor developed the design.",1
5
The Court did not rule on whether Boyle satisfied the test but remanded
the case to the Fourth Circuit for review under the new standard.
8 6
B. Court Created Doctrine
In the dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority for creating a doc-
trine unprescribed by Congress. "The Court-unelected and unaccountable
to the people-has unabashedly stepped into the breach to legislate a rule
denying Lt. Boyle's family the compensation that state law assures them."8 7
Justice Brennan warned that the majority had created a defense so "breath-
takingly sweeping" 8 that "[ilt applies even if the government has not inten-
tionally sacrificed safety for other interests like speed and efficiency, and,
indeed, even if the equipment is not of a type that is typically considered
dangerous." 9 Moreover, the defense could be invoked regardless of how
flagrant the defect is and how easily it can be remedied, so as long as the
contractor missed it and the government approved reasonably precise
specifications.9"
Others have criticized the Court's ruling calling it "undeniably judicial
legislation at its most extreme." 9' Critics take offense with the Court's de-
83. Id.
84. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
85. Id. The Fifth Circuit has attempted to clarify the necessary requirements of the first
prong by indicating that the "approval" by the government must involve more than rubber-
stamping a contractor's specification or decision but must illustrate a discretionary function.
See Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 876
F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 327 (1989) ("[a] rubber stamp is not a discretion-
ary function; therefore, a rubber stamp is not 'approval' under Boyle"); But see Scadron, supra
note 30, at 379 ("[u]nder Boyle, so long as the United States approved, even if by rubber
stamp, design specifications," the first prong is satisfied).
86. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2519, on remand, 857 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
559 (1988), reh'g denied, 109 S. Ct. 1182 (1989).
87. Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id. See Scadron supra note 30, at 392 n.58 (noting that before Boyle, courts were
uncertain whether the military contractor defense applied to equipment not typically consid-
ered dangerous).
90. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2520.
91. Kriendler, supra note 6, at 3, col. 2.
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parture from the Feres-Stencel doctrine9 2 and are further upset by the fact
that the Court's limitations on state tort law were undertaken without an
authorizing act of Congress.9 3 Commentators note that the Court's flat
rejection of the Shaw test supports the dissent's concerns of rubber stamping
in that "it now makes no difference whether or not, or to what extent,
the manufacturers influenced or contributed to the substance of the
specification. ,
94
Supporters of the ruling foresee mixed blessings for government contrac-
tors. For instance, as a result of the decision there now exists a defense
which should be more expansive than that allowed under the test previously
utilized in the circuit courts. This effect is illustrated by the Court's expan-
sion of the doctrine to bar suits brought not only by members of the armed
services but also by civilians, where conditions justify preemption. Civilians
may be barred from recovery due to the Court's reliance on the discretionary
function exemption,95 which is not limited to service-related injuries. 9'
Some analysts argue that the circuit courts felt comfortable with the govern-
ment contractor defense only because it applied to servicemen who, irrespec-
tive of the result of the litigation, received benefits from the Pentagon and
the Veterans Administration.9 7 The Court's extension of the doctrine could
result in an entirely uncompensated class of injured plaintiffs, a possibility
which troubled lower courts.98 Additionally, many supporters of the de-
fense have theorized that Justice Brennan's statement referring to the
Court's ruling as "breathtakingly sweeping, ' 99 suggests that "the court im-
plicitly intended a broader rule than it explicitly announced.''o
One problem with the Court's redefined defense is the Court's failure to
92. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
93. Kriendler, supra note 6, at 3, col. 2.
94. Scadron, supra note 30, at 386.
95. The Feres-Stencel doctrine which bars suits against the government is based on sover-
eign immunity and therefore only applies to injured servicemen. This expansion of the doc-
trine by Justice Scalia adds a new dimension to the previously supported government
contractor defense. See also Scadron, supra note 30, at 379-80 ("Clearly, it is the design of
military equipment that is of primary concern, not the status of the injured party.").
96. Willmore, supra note 6, at 17, col. 2.
97. Id.
98. Private citizens have been previously subjected to the defense and thus, have been
injured without compensation. Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2d 946, 947 (4th
Cir. 1989) (private citizen trained by the Air Force injured while working on a Navy F/A-18
fighter aircraft at the Naval Air Test Center in which his employer, the defendant, a subcon-
tractor, successfully used the defense).
99. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2520 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
100. O'Toole, Defendants Win Big, But Face Legal and Political Aftershocks, Legal Times,
July 18, 1988, at 20, col. 3.
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identify the nuances of the test, thereby creating the need for a case-by-case
exploration of the outer parameters of the defense.' Generally, product
liability suits involve claims based on either a theory of defective manufac-
turing, defective design, or a failure to warn. The Boyle court only consid-
ered claims of defective design. Future litigation will dictate whether the
decision is applicable in defective manufacturing and failure-to-warn cases as
well. The Fifth Circuit has responded to the Boyle ruling, and this apparent
limitation on the ruling, by concluding that "[t]he [Boyle] opinion does not
change the law in this and other Circuits except to reject the ideological
basis for contractor immunity based upon the Feres doctrine. Hence, it re-
mains the law ... that military contractor immunity does not apply... [to]
... defective manufactur[ing]."'' 2 However, in Nicholson v. United Technol-
ogies,'013 the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut fur-
ther applied the Boyle opinion to cases involving failure-to-warn. In
Nicholson, the plaintiffs argued that the contractor failed to provide sufficient
warnings in the helicopter manual. The contractor alleged that the govern-
ment controlled the contents of the manual." The court, in applying the
Boyle decision to failure-to-warn cases, concluded that "[1]iability for failure
to warn ... would have the same negative effects on military procurement as
was outlined in Boyle. Further the government's decision ... [in this case]
involves the same balancing of technical, military and even social considera-
tions protected in Boyle.' ' 5 Therefore, the court permitted the application
of the government contractor defense as an affirmative defense in both defec-
tive design and failure-to-warn cases.' °6
101. Id. This author notes that since the Court's ruling several cases have applied and
defined the Boyle defense. See Trevino v. General Dynamics, 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir. 1989)
(clarified and defined the "approval" requirement); Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878
F.2d 1311 (11 th Cir. 1989) (determining what can be characterized as a manufacturing or a
design defect in order to apply the test); Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft, Co., 874 F.2d 946
(4th Cir. 1989) (government participation factor); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135 (5th
Cir. 1989) (questioned the "approval of reasonably precise specifications").
102. McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 774, 777 (5th Cir. 1988).
103. 697 F. Supp. 598 (D. Conn. 1988).
104. Id. at 603.
105. Id. at 604.
106. The court utilized the Boyle standard. The court held that the contractor satisfied the
first prong by adequately demonstrating that the government precisely outlined the changes to
the manuals and the specifications used in the development of the manuals. Id. at 604. The
court concluded that the contractors proved that they were not aware of the hazards posed by
the landing gear and that the plaintiff failed to offer evidence rebutting that conclusion. Id. at
605. Thus, the court held that the contractor was entitled to summary judgment. See Fairchild
Republic Co., v. The United States and the Department of the Air Force, 712 F. Supp. 711,
715-16 (S.D. Ill. 1988) (Boyle test applied and upheld the contractor defense where the court
defined the government's failure to Warn employees about hazardous material as
discretionary).
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IV. CONSQUENCES ON MASS Toxic TORT ACTIONS
A. Questions Not Answered
A number of questions have been identified that were not answered in the
Agent Orange or Boyle decisions and which could affect future mass toxic
tort litigation. As noted in recent cases, one question is whether the Boyle
defense is limited to defective-design product liability claims, or whether it
applies to other, types of liability.10 7 A second question is whether the de-
fense will be limited to military contractors.1 0 8 After consideration of the
underlying policies of the defense and the Court's rejection of the Feres-
Stencel doctrinal basis, it is possible to theorize that the defense's now ex-
panded application to civilian plaintiffs will lead to application in the non-
defense activities.
The Boyle Court specifically denied application of the defense to off-the-
shelf products,"° a fact which raises questions about reliance on the defense
in the non-arms arena.I° An argument for application could be made using
the Agent Orange facts. Agent Orange was a commercially available herbi-
cide prior to its use in Vietnam, however, the specific concentrations used
were determined pursuant to detailed government specifications. This "off-
the-shelf" product did not retain its commercial makeup when utilized by
the government. This argument raises doubts as to the defense's practical
use when Agent Orange can be defined as an off-the-shelf and commercially
available product and thus be unqualified to use the defense under Boyle.
Therefore, the defense becomes a vague mixture of two extremes.
Interestingly, the Court recently denied review of cases connected with
the Agent Orange litigation.' The most significant case involved those vet-
erans who opted out of the principal Agent Orange class action. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Judge Weinstein's determination that sum-
. 107. Willmore, supra note 6, at 17, col. 3. Failure-to-warn product liability claims and
negligence-based claims are significantly more numerous in toxic tort actions. See P. SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986).
108. Willmore, supra note 6, at 17, col. 3.
109. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1988).
110. One commentator notes that the Court's pronouncement of an off-the-shelf exception
"is unclear... as to whether there is no design specification at issue (its use of the term "from
stock" may imply this) or whether the Court means to continue to limit application of the
government contractor defense to equipment which is uniquely military in. nature." Scadron,
supra note 30, at 380. The commentator concluded that in his opinion the Court was not
extending the defense to off-the-shelf consumer products because none of the policies support-
ing application of the defense encompass such products. Id. at 392.
111. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (D.C.N.Y. 1985), 818 F.2d
187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988). See also
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. v. Dow Chem. Co., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (D.C.N.Y. 1985),
818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Krupkin v. Dow Chem. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2899 (1988).
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mary judgment should be granted to the defendants."' The court applied
the government contractor defense set forth by Judge Weinstein. The
Supreme Court's action is significantly confusing because by failing to review
the decision or to remand it for application of the Boyle test, the Court al-
lowed for the use of a different government contractor defense.
One might question whether denial of review by the Supreme Court of the
Second Circuit's ruling reflects an acceptance of the Agent Orange defense
over the Boyle defense. In application, the two tests are sigfiificantly differ-
ent. For example, Boyle's third prong requiring contractors to warn the gov-
ernment clearly contradicts the Agent Orange defense which compares the
government's knowledge with a reasonable contractor's knowledge. Addi-
tionally, the Agent Orange defense was tailored to combat the uniqueness of
the facts involved, as indicated in Judge Winter's definition of a hazard. In
contrast, the Boyle test has been constructed to address all possible
applications.
Adding more doubt to the future application of the Boyle decision, the
Court recently denied review of Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.l" 3 in
which the Eleventh Circuit held the defendants liable for the death of a mili-
tary pilot. The Boyle decision specifically rejected the standards used in the
Eleventh Circuit' 14 as inadequately protecting federal interests. Counsel for
the defendants was puzzled at the Court's denial of rehearing and could only
speculate that interpretations of the Death on the High Seas Act were con-
tributing factors." 5 In the Boyle decision, Justice Scalia noted that the case
might not have been decidedly differently under the Act and because that
issue was not before the Court "it [is] inappropriate to decide it in order to
refute (or for that matter, to construct) an alleged inconsistency."' 16 How-
ever, as Grumman argued in its petition for rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit
standard rejected in Boyle appears to be the one that will govern in Death on
the High Seas Act cases in that circuit. Thus, a "direct and substantial con-
flict among the circuits"'' 7 now exists.
112. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1263 (D.C.N.Y. 1985), 818
F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Lombardi v. Dow Chem., 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988). "[I]n
light of the information received to date, [it is clear] that the government knew as much as, or
more than the defendant ... about the adverse health effects of Agent Orange." Id.
113. 778 F.2d 736 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
114. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
115. 50 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 100 (July 11, 1988).
116. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
117. 50 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 407 (Aug. 29, 1988) (quoting Shaw v. Grumman Aero-
space Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (1 1th Cir. 1985), from petition for rehearing).
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B. Future Litigation
Peter Schuck succinctly stated that "[i]n the Agent Orange case, we con-
front an unprecedented challenge to our legal system: a future in which the
law must grapple with chemical revolution and help us live comfortably with
it."" 8 Many authors compare asbestos litigation to the Agent Orange litiga-
tion. "9 Johns-Manville Corporation, the nation's largest asbestos manufac-
turer, filed for reorganization after it became obvious that defending the
extremely large number of filed lawsuits (as well as anticipated lawsuits)
would cost the company over two billion dollars.' 20 This example only con-
firms the courts' fears that without the general contractor defense national
security could be threatened. In light of the Boyle decision, asbestos cases
such as Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp."'2 could be ruled upon dif-
ferently even though the Hansen court had stressed the importance of the
plaintiff's civilian status in denying application of the government contractor
defense.
The application of the Boyle decision in asbestos litigation in which the
use of asbestos is in both private and public shipyards has been addressed by
one district court.' 22 The court denied the contractor's motion for summary
judgement based on the military contractor defense. The court reasoned
that there was no conflict of state and federal interest because federal specifi-
cations were silent as to requirements for warning labels.'2 3 Moreover, the
court distinguished Nicholson because on those facts the "government's con-
trol was exhaustive and preclusive." '124 Moreover, the court rejected the de-
fendant's contention that "the government's asserted fear of labor unrest and
[shipyard worker] lawsuits would have impeded any . . . 'uniquely federal
interest' sufficient to displace state common law."' 25 Therefore, the court
concluded that the defense was inapplicable in this case because of a lack of
justifiable displacement. Even if an asbestos contractor could prove the nec-
118. Schuck, supra note 107, at 6.
119. Agent Orange and the Government Contract Defense, supra note 7, at 506-07 n.74. See
generally Note, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,: The Government Contractor Defense, 8 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 189, 202-03 (1989).
120. Miami Herald, Aug. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (int'l ed.).
121. 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985) (a suit brought for
injuries to a shipyard worker allegedly incurred from working with asbestos).
122. In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 715 F. Supp. 1167 (E.S.D.N.Y.
1988).
123. Id. at 1168. The court distinguished Boyle because in those facts state and federal law
directly conflicted over the placement of the escape hatch.
124. Id. at 1169 (citing Nicholson v. United Technologies, 697 F. Supp. 598 (D. Conn.
1988)).
125. Id. at 1169. The court relied on In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, No. 85-0447
(D. Haw. Oct. 24, 1988), for support.
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essary prerequisite to the defense, the hurdle of the third prong remains.
The contractors must show that the government had equal knowledge of the
hazards of asbestos. This may prove difficult for the contractor because "the
history of asbestos litigation ... has left little doubt that most asbestos. com-
panies possessed equal knowledge of the hazards posed by their products at
shipyards, but did little to advance the medical state of the art." '126 The
third prong may become the asbestos manufacturer's fatal flaw in the suc-
cessful use of the defense.
One recent application of the Boyle defense has caused public outrage and
has raised questions of health and safety welfare responsibility. In a class
action suit against NLO Inc.,' 27 owners of an uranium processing plant in
Fernald, Ohio, community residents charged that the plant emitted
thousands of pounds of uranium dust into the air, discharged waste into a
nearby river and stored material from the World War II Manhattan Atomic
Project in leaking concrete silos.128 Department of Energy officials have re-
vealed that the government knew for decades that the plant was emitting
hazardous substances and that the "problems at Fernald stemmed from the
government's capital investment and policy decisions."' 129 The government's
acknowledgement was an attempt to insulate NLO from liability and take
advantage of the Boyle decision by claiming a discretionary action. 130 The
government's action was a complete change of tactic after assuring residents
prior to Boyle that "safety and welfare of employees at the site and our
neighbors ... [are a] high priority."' 3' However, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied the government's motion to
dismiss the suit under the government contractor defense. 132 The Fernald
plant litigation raises concern that the defense will be used as a legal tactic to
circumvent liability, to encourage participation in the risky nuclear industry
and to allow for the failure to implement health and safety measures.,
3 3
Therefore, one must ask whether Boyle is being stretched too far.
126. Scadron, supra note 30, at 397. Most companies did not warn the government until
after 1972 when Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). The au-
thor notes that the courts have considered the government's involvement as secondary. Id. at
398.
127. In re Fernald Litig. No. 85-0149 (S.D. Ohio 1989) The suit claims damages for de-
clining property values and the emotional trauma caused by the presence of the 1984 plant
radon leak.
128. Newsday Nassau and Suffolk Edition, Mar. 1, 1989, at 67.
129. Id. The officials also stated that it was a government decision "not to spend money to
stop the pollution or tell the public about it." Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1988, at 3, col. 2.
130. Newsday, supra note 128, at 67.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1988, at 22. See Newsday, supra note 128, at 67 ("the govern-
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V. CONCLUSION
The United States government's decision to order the manufacture and
use of the herbicide Agent Orange in Vietnam has resulted in many debates,
only one of which is the application of the government contractor defense.
In an effort to protect the discretionary function rule and guarantee contrac-
tors equitable treatment, the defense allows a contractor to escape liability
for injuries resulting from defective designs which have been specified by the
government. The bottom line concern reflected in the development of the
defense centers on the effect of accountability on national security. This fear
propelled the defense from a limited, generally discouraged argument, to a
widely accepted and expanding affirmative defense.
Judge Weinstein's standard in Agent Orange began this growth which
culminated in the Supreme Court's ruling in Boyle. The Court continued the
expansion by rejecting the previously accepted Feres/Stencel doctrinal basis
and finding justification in the discretionary function involved in these
"uniquely federal" interests. Thus, the Court has allowed preemption of
state law and created a federal doctrine. Many critics raise questions as to
the practical application of the Boyle test, however, only future litigation will
answer those questions. Moreover, public outrage may play a larger role in
the future application of the defense if nonmilitary contractors, such as the
Fernald nuclear plant, successfully escape liability through the application of
the defense. In the interim, practitioners should be aware that the applica-
tion of the defense in the courts of this country may not be entirely uniform
as the Supreme Court appears to have inadvertently created confusion.
Mary Cathern Hensinger
ment's catch-22 legal strategy is a cause for alarm, for it raises questions about the govern-
ment's trustworthiness about all nuclear safety").
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